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Abstract
We examine the volume-volatility relation using detailed data from a limit order driven
equity market. Estimates of the intraday slope of the demand and supply schedules of the order
book are found to capture regularities in spreads, trade size and submission strategies which are
believed to be related to asymmetric information. On a daily level, the order book slope should
also captures diﬀerences in dispersion of beliefs about stock values. The relationship between
our daily slope measure and the contemporaneous volatility across companies and time supports
models where strategic trading and dispersion of beliefs increase both volume and volatility.
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11 Introduction
A variety of studies document that there is a positive correlation between price volatility and
trading volume for most types of ﬁnancial contracts including stocks, Treasury bills, currencies and
various futures contracts. Theoretically this can be explained by new information on asset values
acting as the driving force on both market prices and trading volume. However, for many types
of ﬁnancial contracts, movements in prices seem much “too large” to be attributed to movements
in the fundamental values of the underlying securities.1 A suggested explanation of this puzzle is
that prices are not merely driven by changes in systematic risk factors and asset payoﬀs but also by
changes in the expectations of heterogeneous agents, possibly facing asymmetric information. We
contribute to this discussion by studying the relationship between the volume-volatility relation and
detailed characteristics of the order book, at the intra-day level as well as in a daily cross-sectional
time series setting.
The main theoretical explanations for the volume-volatility relation are summarized in two
hypotheses. “The mixture of distribution hypothesis” states that the daily price change and the
trading volume are both mixtures of independent normals with the same mixing variable. Harris
(1986) links the hypothesis to asset pricing theory, and suggests that the mixing variable is the
process that directs the rate of ﬂow of information from systematic risk factors into prices and
trading volume. “The dispersion of beliefs hypothesis” states that the volume-volatility relation
will be stronger the greater the dispersion of beliefs about security values among investors. The
dispersion of beliefs hypothesis is based on an assumption of asymmetric information and strategic
investor behavior. Uninformed traders cannot distinguish informed trades from liquidity trades,
and by reacting to trades with no information content, they increase both volatility and volume
relative to equilibrium values. Intuitively, models based on the two hypotheses should complement
rather than substitute each other.
A problem in empirical studies of the volume-volatility relation is that it is hard to test the
theoretical explanations in a standard way. The mixture of distribution hypothesis merely states
that when trades reﬂect information, prices will adjust to new equilibria over time. It is hard
to set up an alternative hypothesis against which this statement can be tested. Nevertheless, a
reconciliation of the general ideas behind the mixture of distribution hypothesis with empirical
predictions from market microstructure models may provide a deeper understanding of the price
1A standard reference for the stock market is Shiller (1981).
2discovery dynamics in ﬁnancial markets.
In this paper, we ﬁrst establish that the the standard volume-volatility relation exists also in
a pure limit order driven market.2 We then try to disentangle how the volume-volatility relation
emerges by investigating the order placements of investors. In order to do this, we divide the order
placement strategies into four groups depending on their aggressiveness. An interesting ﬁnding is
that within the group of aggressive orders, the most aggressive ones are submitted at the beginning
of the trading day. Orders in the passive group, on the other hand, are relatively more passive
in the beginning of the trading day. This is systematic across sub-periods, market caps and tick-
sizes. Assuming that the aggressive/passive orders are mainly submitted by informed/uninformed
investors, we interpret this as reﬂecting that informational asymmetries are more pronounced at
the beginning of the trading day, that there is competition among informed traders, and that
uninformed traders require a compensation for the higher risk of trading with informed traders
at the beginning of the day. This explanation is also supported by a decrease in various spread
measures during the trading day.
A central part of our study centers around the shape of the order book which we argue consti-
tutes a reasonable proxy for the dispersion of beliefs about asset prices. To capture the shape, we
use the average elasticity (or slope) of the supply and demand schedules in the limit order book.
The higher the elasticity (steeper the slope)3, the less dispersed are the bid and ask prices in the
order book. Hence, if the slopes of the supply and demand schedules in the order book are steep, we
interpret this as an indication that there is a high degree of agreement among investors about the
fair value of the security. This because orders are submitted close to the prevailing midpoint price.
Similarly, if the the slopes are gentle, we interpret this as an indication that the investors disagree
about the value of the security. We notice that, in case of asymmetric information, order placement
strategies will also reﬂect traders’ fear of being ripped oﬀ by someone with superior information.
In addition, high volatility may induce investors to submit orders further away from the midpoint
to reduce the probability of incurring a loss when reversing their position. On the other hand, the
high volatility may itself reﬂect that there is a high degree of uncertainty related to the valuation
2Our analysis also indicates that the number of transactions (as a component of volume) is a good proxy for the
mixing variable assuming a mixture of distribution explanation of the relation. This part of the analysis is largely
based on Jones et al. (1994). Using daily data of Nasdaq-NMS securities over the 1986-1991 period, they ﬁnd that the
average size of trades has no information content on volatility beyond that contained in the number of transactions.
This ﬁnding is interpreted as supportive of a mixture of distribution hypothesis where the number of trades is a proxy
for the mixing variable (daily information arrivals).
3This is in the case of direct demand and supply curves (prices on the x-axis and accumulated volume on the
y-axis). In the case of inverted demand and supply curves, the relationship would be opposite.
3of the stock.
By investigating how the slope of the order book depends on the types and the aggressiveness of
submitted orders, we show that the slope may capture both uninformed traders’ fear of being ripped
oﬀ by informed traders and the dispersion of beliefs among investors about asset valuation. The
ﬁrst component seems more pronounced at an intraday level, while the latter component becomes
important across ﬁrms and time. We ﬁnd that there is a systematic negative relation between the
average slope of the order book and the price volatility on an intraday level as well as in a daily
time series cross section analysis.
Section 2 surveys the literature on the volume-volatility relation and motivates our study. Sec-
tion 3 describes our data sample and provides results on the basic volume-volatility relation in the
Norwegian equity market. Section 4 provides some summary statistics for the order book and dis-
cusses how to use this information to proxy for the heterogeneity of investors. Section 5 examines
in detail the order ﬂow and order book on a intra-daily basis. Section 6 provides estimation results
on the relationship between the shape of the order book and the volume-volatility relation. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 Literature
The early research into the volume-volatility relation is reviewed in Karpoﬀ (1987). The main theo-
retical explanation from this period is known as the “mixture of distribution hypothesis” (hereafter
the MDH). According to the MDH, there is a positive correlation between daily price changes and
trading volume because both variables are mixtures of independent normals with the same mixing
variable. Originally, the MDH was suggested by Clark (1973) as an alternative explanation for
the observed leptokurtosis in the distribution of log price changes.4 The basic idea underlying the
hypothesis is that prices and trading volume are driven by a time-varying arrival rate of informa-
tion.5 Let ∆pi,t and vi,t be respectively the intraday price change and volume of trade resulting
from information event number i on date t, and let nt be the total number of information events
4Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1963) showed that the return distributions of commodity and stock prices were
leptokurtic, and well approximated by symmetric stable distributions with characteristic exponents between 1 and
2 (the normal distribution has a characteristic exponent equal to 2). An examination of the stable distributions
hypothesis for the Norwegian market is provided in Skjeltorp (2000) who shows that a characteristic exponent
between 1.6 and 1.7 best characterizes the Norwegian data.
5Copeland (1976, 1977)’s “sequential arrival of information” model which is later extended by Jennings et al. (1981)
and Jennings and Barry (1983) also predicts a positive relationship between volume and absolute price changes. The
main feature of the model is that information is disseminated to only one traders at a time, and the main criticism
of the models is that traders cannot learn from the market prices as other traders become informed.
4during day t. Assume that (i) the number of events each day, nt, varies across days, and that (ii)
the intraday price changes, ∆p, and trading volumes, v, are jointly independently and identically
distributed with ﬁnite variances.6 The daily price change and trading volume are equal to the sum








where ∆Pt is the daily price change and Vt is the daily trading volume. Given equation (1), and
provided that nt is large, the joint distribution of the daily price change and volume of trade will be
approximately bivariate normal conditional on nt.7 The volume-volatility relation arises because
both price changes and trading volume are likely to be large when the number of information events
is large and small when the number of information events is small.8
The MDH simply states that price changes and trading volume are directed by the ﬂow of new
information. It does not say anything about what type of information or how this information is
revealed to investors. Hence, an important limitation of the hypothesis is that it does not address
the role of economic agents or market structure for prices and trading volume. Later theoretical
work on the volume-volatility relation centers around these issues. Harris (1986) links the MDH to
asset pricing theory by suggesting that the mixing variable directs the rate of ﬂow of information
from systematic risk factors. A problem with this interpretation is that the movements in prices
for many types of ﬁnancial contracts seem much “too large” to be attributed to movements in the
fundamental values of the underlying securities only.9 This fact suggests that prices are not merely
driven by changes in systematic risk factors and asset payoﬀs but also by changes in the expectations
of heterogeneous agents. Figure 1 illustrates the information structure in a standard asset market
for the two main types of such models. Panel (a) in the ﬁgure describes a “diﬀerences in opinion”
model, while panel (b) describes a market microstructure model with asymmetric information.
In the “diﬀerences of opinion” model, investors are assumed to act diﬀerently on the same news,
i.e. trading is induced by diﬀerences of opinion about publicly available information. Beliefs are
updated using Bayes rule. All traders are rational, but they view others as having irrational models.
6Our explanation of the MDH is largely based on Harris (1987).
7See Harris (1987), page 129.
8The variation in the daily number of information events implies that the expectation of the unconditional distri-
bution is a weighted average (or “a mixture”) of the conditional distributions.
9A standard reference for the stock market is Shiller (1981).
5Figure 1: The Information Structure
The ﬁgure illustrates the assumed information structure in a “diﬀerences in opinion” model (panel a) and a market microstruc-
ture model (panel b). From the fundamental asset pricing equation, Pi,t = Et[
P∞
j=0 Mt+jXi,t+j], we know that relevant
information about the price, P, of an asset, i, may come from either news about the stochastic discount factor, Mi, or news
about the payoﬀ, Xi. In the “diﬀerences in opinion” model in panel a, all news arrives as public information. Some types of
information is immediately incorporated into the asset price. For other types of information, traders disagree on the eﬀects
on the valuation of the underlying assets. Trading occurs whenever the cumulative information for a particular type of trader
switches from favourable to unfavourable. In the market microstructure model in panel b, new information arrives as either
public or private information. Public information is immediately incorporated into the asset price. Informed traders trade on
the basis of private information. Uninformed investors are either liquidity traders or speculators. The uninformed investors are






















Harris and Raviv (1993) explain the volume-volatility relation by a model of this kind. Two groups
of risk neutral speculators receive the same information but disagree on the extent to which it is
important. As long as one of the groups remain more optimistic than the other, there is no trading.
Trading occurs only and whenever the cumulative information for one of the trader groups switches
from favorable to unfavorable.
In the standard asset pricing models, prices adjust immediately as a result of new information,
and the trading process itself does not convey incremental information which is relevant to price
determination. This is a plausible assumption for some kind of news. Other types of news are
likely to be dispersed and not immediately available to all investors in aggregated form. Evidence
of the existence of dispersed news is given in French and Roll (1986) who document empirically
that asset prices are much more volatile during exchange trading hours than during non-trading
6hours. This phenomenon cannot be reconciled with a standard asset pricing model unless there is
a systematic tendency for price relevant information to arrive during normal business hours only.
Modelling dispersed information is the essential feature in the market microstructure models illus-
trated in panel (b). In these models, there is a group of investors who trade on the basis of private
information. The market maker and the uninformed investors can only infer this information from
trades and order ﬂows. The room for strategic behavior among agents diﬀer in diﬀerent models.10
Shalen (1993) use a market microstructure model to study the volume-volatility relation. In the
model, both trading volume and price volatility increases with the dispersion of traders’ expecta-
tions about fundamental values. This is called the “dispersion of beliefs hypothesis”(hereafter the
DBH). The dispersion of beliefs about the value of a security is assumed to be wider the larger
the share of the traders in the security that consists of uninformed investors. Uninformed traders
cannot distinguish informed trades from hedgers’ liquidity trades. Instead they react as if all trades
were informative, and thus they increases both volatility and volume relative to equilibrium values.
Harris (1986) ﬁnds both empirical support for the MDH based on cross sectional tests of common
stocks continuously traded on the NYSE or one of the regional exchanges in the period 1976-1977.
The critical assumption behind the tests is that the distribution of the mixing variable is not
identical for all securities. Assuming that transactions take place at a uniform rate in event time,
Harris (1987) ﬁnd both theoretical motivation and empirical support for the use of the daily number
of transactions as a proxy for the time-varying unobserved information evolution rate.11 However,
since the arrival rate of new information is unobservable, we do not know whether parts of the
volume-volatility relation is a result of the actions of heterogeneous traders. If trading is self-
generating, the daily number of transactions would be the true mixing variable rather than a proxy
for the unobserved information evolution rate.
The problem caused by a lack of ability to interpret the mixing variable can be illustrated
by looking at the study of Jones et al. (1994). Using a simple regression approach on daily data
of Nasdaq-NMS securities over the 1986-1991 period, they ﬁnd that both volatility and trading
volume are positively correlated with the number of daily transactions. However, the average size
10In Kyle (1985), informed investors attempt to camouﬂage their trades by spreading them over time. Kyle’s model
implies that larger volumes support more informed traders. In Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), a certain amount of the
uninformed investors are allowed to act strategically by having the discretion to time their trading. This is shown
to imply that within-day trading becomes concentrated. Hence, price changes and transactions are bunched in time,
and the eﬀect of volume on price movements will depend on recent volume levels.
11Harris (1987) derives and tests several implications of the MDH for transactions data on a sample of 50 NYSE
stocks that traded between December 1, 1981 and January 31, 1983. The results from the tests are supportive of the
MDH.
7of trades contain no additional information about volatility beyond that contained in the number
of transactions. If the number of transactions is a good proxy for the mixing variable, this result
is supportive of a pure MDH; “..volatility and volume are positively correlated only because both
are positively related to the number of daily information arrivals (the mixing variable).” However,
trade size would also be unimportant if informed traders camouﬂage their information, for example
by splitting their orders into medium size trades as suggested by the “stealth trading hypothesis”
of Barclay and Warner (1993). In this case, the number of daily transactions would be the true
mixing variable and the results in Jones et al. (1994) would also support an explanation of the
volume-volatility relation based on heterogeneous traders.12
Daigler and Wiley (1999) perform an indirect test of the DBH. Using the argument that there
is a greater dispersion of beliefs among uninformed traders than among informed traders, and
facilitating the possibility of distinguishing traders with diﬀerent types of information in the futures
markets, they test whether uninformed traders contribute to volatility. The results of their study
supports the DB-hypothesis: “..uninformed traders who cannot diﬀerentiate liquidity demand from
fundamental value increase volatility.”13
3 The Norwegian equity market
3.1 The Oslo Stock Exchange
Our data set is from the the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in Norway.14 Norway is a member of
the European Economic Area, and its equity market is among the 30 largest world equity markets
by market capitalization.15 Table 1 report some general statistics for all the companies listed on
the OSE. At the end of 2001, 190 ﬁrms were listed on the exchange with a total market value of
about 657 mill NOK. 29 percent of this value was owned by foreign investors. The OSE is the
12In addition, in order driven markets, a large order is often automatically executed against many smaller orders
by the automatic matching system. Thus, even though the original order is large, it may show up as many small
trades as it is matched against several smaller orders rendering the average daily trade size unimportant in explaining
volatility.
13In a similar study, Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) examine the volume-volatility relation and the contribution
to volatility from market depth (proxied by open interest) in eight physical and ﬁnancial futures markets in the
1982-1990 period. Unexpected volume is found to have a larger eﬀect on volatility than expected volume, and large
open interest is found to mitigate volatility.
14We obtained the data directly from the exchange’s surveillance system. The SMARTS
c  system is the core of
the exchange’s surveillance operations. Through access to the SMARTS
c  database, we obtained all the information
on orders and trades in the market
15Source is FIBV (International Federation of Stock exchanges). Notable Norwegian listings include Norsk Hydro,
Telenor, and Statoil.
8only regulated market place for securities trading in Norway. Since January 1999, it has operated
as a fully computerized centralized limit order book system similar to the public limit order book
systems in e.g. Paris, Toronto, Stockholm and Hong Kong.
The OSE allows the use of limit orders, market orders, and various customary order speciﬁ-
cations.16 As is normal in most electronic order driven markets, the order handling rule follows
a strict price-time priority.17 All orders are submitted at prices constrained by the minimum tick
size for the respective stocks which is determined by the price level of the stock.18
The trading day at the OSE comprises of two sessions; the “pre-trade” session starting at 9:30
and ending with an opening auction at 10:00, and the “continuous trading” session from 10:00
until the trading closes at 16:00.19 During the pre-trade session, brokers can register trades that
were executed after the close on the previous day as well as new orders. The pre-trade session is
ended with an opening auction, when all the orders registered in the order book are automatically
matched if the prices are crossing or equal. The quoted opening price is thus the price that clears
the market. During the continuous trading session, electronic matching of orders with crossing or
equal price generates transactions. Orders without a limit price (market orders) have automatic
price priority and are immediately executed at the best available prices. At the OSE, market orders
are allowed to “walk the book” until it is fully executed. Any remaining part left of the market
order is removed from the order book. This is diﬀerent from the treatment of market orders at
e.g. the Paris Bourse, where any remaining part of an unﬁlled order is automatically converted to
a limit order at the current quote.20
3.2 The data sample
The data set consists of every order and trade that occurred at the OSE in the period from February
1999 through June 2001.
16Participants can also submit hidden orders. When an order is submitted as a hidden order, only a speciﬁed
fraction of the underlying order is visible to the market.
17When a visible part of a hidden order is executed, the next part of the hidden order looses its time priority and
is placed at the back of the queue at the respective price level.
18For prices lower than NOK 9.99 (Norwegian kroner) the tick size is NOK 0.01, between NOK 10 and NOK 49.9
the tick size is NOK 0.1, between NOK 50 and NOK 999.5 the tick size is NOK 0.5 and for prices above NOK 1000
the tick size is NOK 1.
19Prior to February 14 2003, the closing price of the market was the price of the last oﬃcial transaction. From 14
February 2003, the OSE has started to close the market through a closing auction similar to the opening auction to
improve the quality of the oﬃcial closing price. The closing auction is conducted from 16:00 until 16:10. This change
does not aﬀect our sample, since our sample stops in July 2001.
20The diﬀerence implies that market orders at OSE are more aggressive than market orders at the Paris Bourse.
At the Paris Bourse, market orders are essentially marketable limit orders.
9Table 1: Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) - general statistics
All numbers in the table are oﬃcial statistics obtained from the OSE annual reports.
1999 2000 2001
Number of registered ﬁrms 195 192 190
Market capitalization (mill. NOK) 531.65 618.36 656.69
NOK/USD exchange ratea 7.81 8.81 8.99
Turnover velocityb 88.6 96.7 85.9
Total dividends (mill. NOK) 11427 9365 10444
Ownership structure
Number of shareholders (individuals) 351062 394304 426739
-norwegians 350485 393645 426183
-foreigners 577 659 556
Foreign ownership (% share capital) 25.43 % 31.46 % 25.49 %
Foreign ownership (% market capitalization) 32.01 % 35.66 % 29.04 %
Market development
Market index level (TOTX) 1153.74 1366.05 933.22
OSE benchmark index 189.76 195.79 167.18
OSE benchmark index return (%) 48.45 3.18 -14.61
aAverage midpoint rate for the respective year. bTurnover velocity: Average of annualized turnover per month divided by
market value at the end of each month. Only capital registered in the VPS.
The trade data contain, for all trades, quantity transacted, a time stamp, brokerage house ID
on each side, and an ID for the house initiated the trade as well as whether the house was the buyer
or a seller in the transaction. Every trade is linked to the underlying orders through the order ID.
Thus, if a large order is executed against many smaller orders resulting in several smaller trades,
we can trace each executed part back to the initial order. There are also additional ﬂags attached
to each trade that identify special features of the trade such as whether it was an odd-lot trade, an
oﬀ-exchange trade, a cross (within the same or diﬀerent brokerage houses), and whether a trade
results from a market order or a limit order. The order book data contain all entered orders and
all deletions and amendments of orders already in the order book. The order book is described in
more detailed in section 4.
In table 2 we provide some descriptive statistics of the trade data throughout our sample
period. A large part of the listed ﬁrms are traded quite infrequently. Since we examine intraday
data, including infrequently traded ﬁrms would introduce a large amount of noise into our analysis.
We therefore ﬁlter the ﬁrms based on trading activity through the sample period. The ﬁrst ﬁltering
criterion is that the ﬁrm must have been traded in at least 400 out of 597 days, or about 70% of
the trading days, and the second criterion is that the ﬁrm must have an average of 5 trades per day
10to be included in our sample. Once the ﬁrst criterion is applied, the second criterion only removes
a few companies from our sample. After the ﬁltering we are left with 108 ﬁrms. Note that there
were 195, 192 and 190 listed ﬁrms at the end of 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively. The numbers in
table 2 are daily cross-sectional averages across the ﬁltered ﬁrms.
The table shows that there has been increasing trading activity in the sample period with the
total number of trades having tripled and the volume in Norwegian kroner (NOK) having doubled.
Further, the average number of daily trades across ﬁrms has more than doubled from 32 in the ﬁrst
half of 1999 to 79 in the ﬁrst half of 2001.21 The increase in activity has also been accompanied by
a decrease in the average percentage spread. To give a better picture of the diversity of the sample,
we divide the sample into four portfolios based on their market capitalization value.22 The general
picture is that the number of trades, the trading volume (both in shares and NOK), the prices
and the quoted spread increase across ﬁrm size portfolios, while the average daily volatility23, the
average trade size and the quoted percentage spread decrease.
We also report the average correlations between the trading volume, the trade size and the
number of transactions. The correlation structure in our sample is quite similar to the one docu-
mented for the US market in Jones et al. (1994). The correlation between the average trade size
and the number of trades is low, and both the average trade size and the number of trades have
high positive correlations with share volume. Hence, the two components of share volume seem
to contain diﬀerent information about volume. The same structure is evident when we calculate
correlations over sub-periods of half a year. Note, however, that the correlation between share
volume and average trade size has decreased from around 62 percent in the ﬁrst half year of 1999
to around 20 percent in the ﬁrst half of 2001.
3.3 The volume-volatility relation
To investigate if there is a volume-volatility relation in our data sample, we follow the regression
approach in Jones et al. (1994). First, we measure the daily return volatility using the standard
procedure in similar empirical studies,24 by running the following regression for each ﬁrm i,
21At the same time, the average trade size has gone down from 3429 shares to 2648 shares. This decline is most
likely related to the introduction and growth of online trading in the sample period, since these traders generate a
lot of trades of small sizes. During our period, the fraction of total trades coming from pure online brokerage houses
has increased from 0% to almost 10%.
22The ﬁrms are assigned to a market capitalization portfolio based on their market capitalization value at the
beginning of each year.
23The volatility measure is discussed in detail the next section.
24See Schwert (1990), Bessembinder and Seguin (1993), Jones et al. (1994), and Daigler and Wiley (1999).
11Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations across subperiods and size portfolios
The table shows some descriptive statistics for the whole sample period as well as for sub-periods of half years. The market
cap groups are resorted at the beginning of each year to account for large changes in market cap for some ﬁrms across years.
Groups 1 consists of the 25% smallest ﬁrms while group 4 is the 25% largest ﬁrms. The Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between
the trading activity variables are also reported. Market values are reported in mill. NOK. The number of trades (N) is the
average number of daily trades across all ﬁrms. The share volume (V) is the average daily share volume (in 1000 shares) across
all ﬁrms. The average trade size (AV) is the average number of shares in each trade averaged across all ﬁrms for the sample
period. The quoted spread is calculated as a percent of the spread midpoint. Eﬀective spread is calculated as the diﬀerence
between the execution price and the spread midpoint (in per cent of the spread midpoint) multiplied by two.
Sub-periods (half years) Market Capitalization groups
Whole
sample 1999.1 1999.2 2000.1 2000.2 2001.1 1 2 3 4
Aggregate statistics:
Number of ﬁrms 108 107 108 108 108 104 27 27 27 27
Trades (in thousands) 3724 328 545 946 953 953 390 522 504 2309
Shares traded (mill.) 9585 1339 2300 2027 2072 1847 1707 1922 919 5037
NOK volume (bill.NOK) 648 67 131 152 153 146 21 44 68 516
Cross-sectional
averages:
Market cap (mill.NOK) 5259 4120 4714 5507 6127 5836 354 938 2339 13978
Price 88.4 71.8 82.7 102.7 102.3 81.9 23.34 62.43 105.66 150.73
Daily volatility (%) 2.71 % 2.64 % 2.89 % 2.98 % 2.48 % 2.57 % 3.49 % 2.98 % 2.30 % 2.29 %
Shares traded (thousands) 151 130 167 155 151 153 116 171 78 288
Trades 58 32 40 72 69 79 28 41 41 148
Tradesize (AV) in shares 2890 3429 3365 2453 2551 2648 4859 2684 1549 1912
Quoted spread (NOK) 1.65 1.55 1.62 1.79 1.78 1.50 0.94 1.63 2.11 1.57
Eﬀective spread (NOK) 1.22 1.12 1.14 1.34 1.36 1.13 0.68 1.20 1.59 1.16
Quoted % spread (midpt.) 3.04 % 3.66 % 3.49 % 2.62 % 2.55 % 2.89 % 4.74 % 2.77 % 2.40 % 1.34 %
Eﬀective % spread (midpt.) 2.22 % 2.67 % 2.48 % 1.92 % 1.89 % 2.15 % 3.38 % 2.03 % 1.85 % 0.99 %
Correlations:
Corr(AV,N) -0.061 0.045 0.051 -0.091 -0.085 -0.084 -0.116 0.280 0.172 -0.066
Corr(V,N) 0.525 0.660 0.591 0.724 0.568 0.442 0.690 0.480 0.847 0.365







βi,jRi,t−j + ^ i,t (2)
where Ri,t is the return of security i on day t, and Dk,t is a day-of-the-week dummy for day k.
To avoid measurement errors due to the bid-ask bounce, we calculate returns from the average
of bid-ask prices at the close. The 12 lagged return regressors estimate short-term movements in
conditional expected returns. The residual, ^ i,t, is an estimate of the unexpected return of security
i on date t. Next, we estimate the regression equations suggested in Jones et al. (1994) to determine
the relative eﬀects of number of trades (N) and trade-size (AV) for volatility,
Model I: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t (3)
Model II: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + γiNi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t (4)
Model III: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t + γiNi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t (5)
The ρi,j’s measures the persistence in volatility across 12 lags. Mt is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, AVi,t is the average trade size (total number of shares
traded divided by the number of transactions for stock i on date t), and Ni,t is the number of
transactions in security i on date t. The regressions are run for each ﬁrm and then the parameter
estimates are averaged across ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst part of table 3 provides the results from the estimation of regression equations 3-5
using daily returns for all companies in our ﬁltered sample. Overall, our results are very much in
line with the results in Jones et al. (1994). The explanatory power of model 2 (with respect to the
adjusted R-squared), where volume is measured by the average number of daily trades, is almost
the double of the explanatory power of the model 1, where volume is measured by the average
trade size. Moreover, the average trade size has little marginal explanatory power when volatility
is conditioned on number of transactions in model 3. These results are further supported by the
characteristics of the sampling distributions of individual-ﬁrm coeﬃcients and t-statistics of the
two variables. In model 3, 95.4 percent of the coeﬃcients for the average number of trades are
statistically signiﬁcant, and 99.1 percent of the average number of trades coeﬃcients were greater
than zero. Similar numbers for the average trade size were respectively 24.1 percent and 57.4
13percent.
As a robustness check we also estimate the equations for sub-periods of half years. The results
from the whole sample regression are conﬁrmed in the sub-sample regressions (not shown in the
paper). Most notably, the ^ γ estimates of the eﬀect of trades (N), as well as their distributional
properties, are very stable across sub-periods. The ^ β estimates, however, vary considerably across
sub-periods and are less signiﬁcant than ^ γ when for model 1 relative to model 3.
Jones et al. (1994) ﬁnd that trade size has some information content for some of the smaller
Nasdaq-NMS ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is interpreted as supportive of the notion that private-information
based trading is important only for the smallest ﬁrms on the stock market. To check for similar
features in our data sample, we re-estimate the three regression models on the four size portfolios.
The results from these estimations are presented in the second part of table 3. Generally, the results
from running separate regressions for each size portfolios follow the same pattern as the results from
running the regression for the whole sample. However, while Jones et al. (1994) ﬁnd that trade size
has stronger explanatory power for the small ﬁrms, we ﬁnd the opposite result that the explanatory
power of trade size is the strongest for the largest ﬁrms. On the other hand, only about half of the
trade size estimates from the single ﬁrm regressions are greater than zero indicating that the eﬀect
may not be very systematic cross-sectionally.
4 Characteristics of the order book
In this section we provide some descriptive statistics of the order book and discuss how to use order
book information to investigate the heterogeneity of investors in the market.
Our order data are extraordinarily rich. For each order, we have a time stamp, a unique order
id, the disclosed/undisclosed quantity as well as ﬂags indicating whether the order was a buy or
sell order, whether the order is a new order, a deletion of an order or an amendment to an existing
order (price change and/or volume change). In addition, a unique brokerage house ID is attached
to each order. Moreover, compared to the Paris Bourse data in Biais et al. (1995), our data are
not restricted to include placements, amendments and deletions of orders within the 5 best quotes.
We have access to all orders and are able to reconstruct the full order book at any point of time.
The descriptive statistics discussed in this section are based on 6 hourly spaced snapshots of the
entire order book during each trading day for each listed company during our sample period25. The
25The order book is rebuilt at 10:30, 11:30, 12:30, 13:30, 14:30 and 15:30 each trading day for each ﬁrm. We
14Table 3: Regression results - whole sample and size portfolios
The table show the results from the estimation of three regression models of the volume/trade size -volatility relation across
market capitalization portfolios as suggested in Jones et al. (1994):
Model I: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t
Model II: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + γiNi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t
Model III: |^ t,i| = αi + αi,mMt + βiAVi,t + γiNi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j|^ i,t−j| + ηi,t
Using the Jones et al. (1994)’s notation we have that “|t,i| is the absolute value of the return of security i in period t, conditional
on its own 12 lags and day-of-week dummies, Mt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for Mondays and 0 otherwise, AVi,t is
the average trade size, Ni,t is the number of transactions for security i on day t, and the coeﬃcients ρi,t measure the persistence
in volatility.” Column 3-5 show parameter estimates averaged across all individual ﬁrm regression equations, while column 6-9
show the parameter distribution. ^ β is the average parameter estimate for the average trade size variable (AV), ^ γ is the average
parameter estimate for the number of trades variable (N). In the distribution of estimates column we report, respectively, the
percentage of ^ β and ^ γ estimates over all single ﬁrm regression equations that are signiﬁcant (has a t-value greater than 2). In
the last two columns we report the percentage of parameter estimates that are greater than zero. The ﬁrst part of the table
shows the results from running the regression equations over the whole sample. The second part of the table shows the similar
results when we split the sample into four size portfolios.
Parameter estimates Distribution of estimates
Model Firms ^ β (AV) ^ γ (N) adj. R2 % t(^ β)>2 % t(^ γ)>2 % ^ β >0 % ^ γ >0
Model I: Tradesize (AV) 108 0.145 - 0.057 26.9 % - 81.5 % -
Model II: Trades (N) 108 - 0.031 0.145 - 95.4 % - 100.0 %
Model III: Both (AV,N) 108 0.053 0.031 0.149 22.2 % 94.4 % 58.3 % 100.0 %
Model I: Tradesize (AV)
1 (small) 27 0.145 - 0.080 16.2 % - 78.4 % -
2 27 0.219 - 0.055 18.2 % - 77.3 % -
3 27 0.274 - 0.048 19.0 % - 64.3 % -
4 (large) 27 1.021 - 0.038 30.8 % - 79.5 % -
Model II: Trades (N)
1 (small) 27 - 0.052 0.174 - 89.2 % - 97.3 %
2 27 - 0.028 0.147 - 75.0 % - 95.5 %
3 27 - 0.036 0.136 - 81.0 % - 95.2 %
4 (large) 27 - 0.014 0.174 - 79.5 % - 92.3 %
Model III: Both (AV,N)
1 (small) 27 0.079 0.053 0.175 10.8 % 86.5 % 64.9 % 97.3 %
2 27 0.076 0.030 0.148 4.5 % 75.0 % 54.5 % 95.5 %
3 27 0.075 0.036 0.140 16.7 % 78.6 % 45.2 % 95.2 %
4 (large) 27 0.237 0.014 0.179 30.8 % 82.1 % 35.9 % 94.9 %
15sample period consists of a total of 597 trading days.
4.1 Composition of orders
In a limit order market, participants either demand liquidity through market orders or supply
liquidity through limit orders to buy or sell. Whether an investor choose to use a market order
or a limit order will depend on his or her motivation for the trade and how pre-committed he
or she is to execute it. In the market microstructure literature, one typically makes a distinction
between informed investors and uninformed investors (or liquidity traders). An uninformed investor
perceives the current market prices as the correct price, and hence, is mainly concerned about
minimizing transaction costs given the degree of trade urgency. The more quickly a liquidity trader
needs to trade, the more aggressive order he or she has to submit to obtain price and time priority.
Liquidity traders who need to buy or sell large amounts of shares will typically try to minimize
the price impact from their trades by following diﬀerent order splitting strategies or by using
hidden orders conditional on current market conditions. Informed traders want to exploit their
information advantage. Typically, the information concerns asset payoﬀs.26 If the information is
“short lived”, informed traders prefer aggressive order placement strategies to extract the proﬁts
of their information as quickly as possible before it becomes common knowledge. Especially if the
private valuation is far away from the current market price. If the information is “long lived”, it
may be more proﬁtable to work the orders into the market through orders of average sizes over
time (”stealth trading”) or by hidden orders. Hence, both informed and uninformed traders may
act to minimize the price impact from their trades to reduce execution costs, but the underlying
motivation for their trading is diﬀerent. After the trades have been executed, only the trades of
informed investors should have a permanent price eﬀect contributing to price discovery.
Price formation in a limit order market was ﬁrst modeled by Glosten (1994). In this model,
privately informed investors are assumed to submit market orders while uninformed investors are
assumed to submit limit orders. Hence, the choice between market orders and limit orders is not
explicitly modelled. Handa and Schwartz (1996) analyze the rationale for limit order trading based
on an analytical framework where traders face a trade oﬀ between the gains from supplying liquidity
exclude order volume above/below 100 ticks away from the inner quotes. For a stock trading at NOK 100 with a
minimum tick size of NOK 0.5 this would mean that orders above NOK 150 and below NOK 50 is excluded from our
calculations. Our sample period stretches from February 1999 through May 2001.
26The information advantage may also concern the likelihood of an information event or the exposure to informed
trading, cf Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) and Foucault et al. (2003b).
16and the losses from trading with informed investors. Based on a simple empirical test they ﬁnd
that limit orders seem to be better than market orders for traders with relatively well-balanced
portfolios. Harris and Hasbrouck (1996) analyze empirically the tradeoﬀs involved in the choice
between market orders and limit orders by computing several order performance measures for a
sample of NYSE SuperDOT orders. Their main ﬁndings are that limit orders placed at or better
than the best quotes generally perform better than market orders, and that passive limit order
traders cannot proﬁtably operate as quasi-dealers in competition with the specialists. Foucault
(1999) use a game theoretic model to study price formation and order placement decisions in a
limit order market. By using limit orders, traders get better execution prices at the cost of non-
execution risk and a winners curse problem. Both Handa and Schwartz (1996) and Foucault (1999)
predict a positive relation between the proportion of limit orders in the market and price volatility.
More speciﬁcally, in Handa and Schwartz (1996), increased volatility makes the gains from supplying
liquidity exceed the loss from trading with informed investors, and in Foucault (1999) increased
volatility makes market orders more costly relative to limit orders. In addition, Foucault et al.
(2003a) model a limit order market where traders are characterized by diﬀerent impatience and
choose between market orders and limit orders in order to minimize their transaction costs. In
equilibrium, the less patient traders are likely to demand liquidity while the more patient traders
are likely to provide it.
We group the orders in our sample into four types based on their trading aggressiveness. “Market
orders” are orders with no limit price. “Aggressive limit orders” are orders that are placed at the
opposite quote (marketable limit order) or at a price further away from the best quote on the
opposite side.27 “Quote improving orders” are orders that are placed in between the inner quotes,
and “Passive orders” are orders that are placed at the best (same side) quote or further away from
the market. Panel A in table 4 shows the composition of orders and the order book activity for
our data sample. The numbers in the table are daily cross sectional time series averages of order
volumes (in shares), and the number of orders submitted. The numbers are averaged over each of
the three years in the sample as well as over market capitalization quartiles.28
From the table, we can see that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in order placements among the
traders in the market. The use of market orders is modest, however, market orders and aggressive
27A marketable limit order is submitted at the opposite quote. If the volume at the opposite quote is greater than
the order size, a marketable limit order is essentially a market order.
28Each ﬁrm is assigned to a market capitalization quartile at the beginning of each year.
17Table 4: Order types, order sizes and order book distribution
Panel A in the table shows daily cross sectional averages for diﬀerent groups of orders. Limit orders are classiﬁed into three
diﬀerent types based on their aggressiveness. Market orders (MO) constitute a separate group. Passive orders are orders
that are submitted at the best (same side) quote or further away from the market. Quote improving orders are orders that
are submitted in between the inner quotes prevailing at order submission, and aggressive orders (Aggr.) are orders that are
submitted at the opposite quote (marketable limit order) or at a price further away from the market on the opposite side. Panel
A also provide statistics on the average order size (in shares) for each order class. The statistics are calculated across all ﬁrms
as well as market capitalization quartiles with yearly sorting. The numbers in parantheses are each order class’ fraction of total
orders. Panel B shows the daily average fraction of accumulated volume in the order book (both bid and ask side) averaged
across all ﬁrms. The statistics is calculated across all ﬁrms, across minimum tick sizes and market capitalizations.
PANEL A: Order types and order sizes
Submitted orders Order sizes
Total Quote Quote
Firms orders Passive impr. Aggr. MO Passive impr. Aggr. MO
All ﬁrms 108 94 42 (0.44) 15 (0.16) 34 (0.36) 4 (0.04) 6428 7063 5882 1715
Market capitalization quartiles
1 (small) 27 45 22 (0.45) 10 (0.21) 14 (0.31) 3 (0.06) 10708 11501 9824 4341
2 27 52 23 (0.43) 10 (0.19) 18 (0.34) 3 (0.05) 6244 7460 5634 1382
3 27 53 22 (0.41) 10 (0.19) 19 (0.37) 3 (0.05) 3437 3900 3038 531
4 (large) 27 224 100 (0.45) 31 (0.14) 87 (0.39) 7 (0.03) 5324 5392 5032 605
PANEL B: Order book volume distribution (normalized)
Minimum tick size ATQ +/- 1 tick +/- 5 tick +/- 10 tick +/- 20 tick +/-50 tick +/-100 tick
All ﬁrms 20.9 % 34.7 % 56.8 % 69.4 % 78.4 % 88.6 % 100.0 %
Minimum tick size
0.01 20.2 % 30.8 % 37.8 % 49.0 % 60.1 % 82.2 % 100.0 %
0.1 22.2 % 34.2 % 53.2 % 67.4 % 79.4 % 91.7 % 100.0 %
0.5 22.3 % 39.1 % 65.8 % 78.4 % 88.1 % 95.5 % 100.0 %
1 7.0 % 10.7 % 17.6 % 25.1 % 38.8 % 70.0 % 100.0 %
Market capitalization quartiles
1 (small) 19.1 % 29.7 % 45.2 % 56.6 % 68.2 % 84.0 % 100.0 %
2 21.6 % 34.9 % 56.3 % 69.6 % 79.9 % 91.1 % 100.0 %
3 23.6 % 38.3 % 62.7 % 75.5 % 83.8 % 92.6 % 100.0 %
4 (large) 19.3 % 34.6 % 62.9 % 75.9 % 84.3 % 91.0 % 100.0 %
18limit orders together constitute around 40 percent of the average daily number of submitted orders.
Measured in number of shares, there are quite large variation in the size of the submitted orders
across order classiﬁcations.29 Quote improving orders are the largest for the entire sample as well
as within market capitalization groups, while market orders are the smallest. This pattern is also
systematic across sub periods (not shown in the table). Measured over the whole sample, on average
94 orders are submitted during a trading day for a ﬁrm. The activity is considerably higher for the
largest ﬁrms than for ﬁrms in the other groups. The average daily number of orders submitted in
this category was 224, while the similar average for the three other groups ranged from 45 to 53.
For comparison, Biais et al. (1995) report an average of 160 orders for the Paris Bourse in 1995.
In Panel B in table 4, we show the distribution of volume in the order book averaged across all
ﬁrms and dates. At each tick level, the fraction of total shares in the order book is averaged over the
6 order book snapshots.30 The table shows the order book distribution across minimum tick sizes
and market capitalization quartiles.31 Around 35 percent of the order book depth is concentrated
at the quotes or plus/minus one tick from the quotes. This is quite stable both across tick sizes
and across market cap quartiles. Note that the depth within +/- 5 ticks, which is what Biais et al.
(1995) investigate, only includes 56 percent of the total order book depth in our sample. There
does not seem to be large diﬀerences in order depth across market capitalization quartiles. The
largest tick size category is special in that it only contains one, highly volatile and very actively
traded, company (as much as 30 percent of the order depth lies between 50 and 100 ticks away
from the quotes).
4.2 Heterogeneity of investors
In section 3 we established that there exists a similar volume-volatility relation in the Norwegian
equity market as has been found for the US by e.g. Jones et al. (1994) and in the UK by Huang
and Masulis (2003). If we interpret the number of trades as a proxy for the mixing variable, our
results also support the MDH.
29A part of this variation can probably be explained by diﬀerences in the price level of the stocks, both over time
and over market capitalizations.
30For instance, at the ask side of the book for one company/snapshot, we divide the aggregate number of shares
at each tick by the total number of shares supplied (oﬀered) at that time/snapshot. We do this for each snapshot,
and average across all snapshots on the particular date to obtain the average fraction supplied on each tick for the
security. Since we limit the order book to orders within +/- 100 ticks from the bid ask midpoint, the fraction of
aggregate volume at +/- 100 ticks is 100%. The limit on 100 +/- ticks result in that we disregard less than 5 percent
of our sample.
31If a ﬁrm trades across two minimum tick sizes on the same day, we remove that company for that day from the
sample. The results do not change if we include these observations.
19The limit order book reﬂects aggregated buy and sell interests at various prices. Each ask (bid)
price reﬂects the lowest (highest) price at which diﬀerent investors are willing to sell (buy) the
security, given their motivations for the trade and their beliefs and information about the value
of the company at a particular point in time.32 Hence, the shape of the order book should make
a reasonable proxy for the dispersion of beliefs about asset prices.33 At the same time, if there
is private information in the market, order placement strategies will also reﬂect traders’ fear of
being ripped oﬀ by someone with superior information. Foucault et al. (2003b) model a limit order
market where liquidity suppliers have asymmetric information on the “rip oﬀ risk”, and show that
this aﬀects the shape of the order book.34 Empirical regularities found in intraday transactions
data indicate that there are intraday variations in the rip oﬀ risk. If so, we should expect the rip
oﬀ risk to be reﬂected in intraday variations in the shape of the order book.
Generally, no group of investors is likely to have access to perfect information about either
future asset payoﬀs or the extent of informed trading. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the daily average
of the shape of the order book across diﬀerent companies and/or over time should therefore also
reﬂect diﬀerences in investors beliefs about underlying asset values. Figure 2, may help to illustrate
this point.
The ﬁgure shows the average order books for two companies listed on the OSE. The order books are
averaged over the ﬁve last days in May 2001, and are normalized in the sense that they show the
percentage of orders within an increasing/decreasing number of ticks away from the quotes (zero in
the ﬁgure is the best quote on each side of the market). The upper picture shows the average order
book for Norsk Hydro (NHY) while the lower picture shows the average order book for Opticom
(OPC). Both companies are among the most liquid at the exchange.35 Norsk Hydro is a leading
32Biais et al. (1995) note that the shape of the order book may reﬂect the competition among buyers/sellers as
well as the correlation in their valuations. If the supply and demand curves are inelastic and volume is concentrated
around the inner quotes, this may reﬂect that the valuations among various investors are correlated on each side of
the market relative to the case where the valuations are more dispersed and the order book is more elastic.
33The order book does not necessarily reﬂect all trading interest. Some orders are used by investors to protect
themselves against losses when markets move rapidly. One such type of orders are “stop orders” which are orders
that are activated when the market price reaches a speciﬁc level. These orders are essentially instructions to the
broker who monitors the market on behalf of the investor and submit the (limit or market) order when the price
level reaches the stop price, i.e. they are not already activated orders such as limit orders. In addition, Biais et al.
(1995) ﬁnd evidence, at the Paris Bourse, that there is potential liquidity supply outside the book from traders that
monitor the book searching for favourable trading opportunities.
34When the book is thin, uninformed liquidity traders will be reluctant to add depth because it may be an indication
of high rip-oﬀ risk. The informed liquidity traders exploit this by bidding less aggressively than in the case where
the liquidity traders have symmetric information.
35During the period illustrated in the ﬁgure, both companies traded in prices around NOK 400-500 and had a tick
size of NOK 0.5. For Norsk Hydro the calculated average order book is based on around 2000 orders with a share
volume of around 400 000 shares. For Opticom the similar calculations are based on around 4000 orders with a share
20Figure 2: Average order books
The ﬁgure illustrates the order book for two diﬀerent companies listed on the OSE. The upper picture shows the order book
for Norsk Hydro, a large Norwegian blue chip company, and the lower picture shows the order book for Opticom, a Norwegian
IT company. The order books are averaged over the last ﬁve days of May 2001. The picture shows the percentage of orders
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21energy, aluminium and fertilizer company, based in Norway. It has 50,000 employees in 60 countries
worldwide. The company’s operations are well known and there is a a large amount of current
available information about the company, including experts analysis. Opticom, on the other hand,
is a relatively new IT company which currently has under 100 employees. The company describes
its business concept as pioneering research and development in new technology in electronics. The
company has no cash ﬂow and very uncertain future income possibilities. Hence, a major diﬀerence
between the two companies is related to valuation uncertainty. Investors’ opinions about the
underlying value of the two companies should be much more dispersed for Opticom than for Norsk
Hydro. This is exactly what the pictures of the order books of the companies indicate: while on
average about 50 percent of the orders for Norsk Hydro has limit prices which lie within 5 ticks
from the quoted spread, the similar percentage for Opticom is only about 10 percent.
This diﬀerence in the average shape of the order book results from the fact that traders sys-
tematically submit orders further away from the midpoint in Opticom than in Norsk Hydro. One
plausible reason for this is that investors are more uncertain about the true value of Opticom
than Norsk Hydro, and that this higher dispersion of beliefs in Opticom is reﬂected in orders that
are submitted across a wider range of prices than in Norsk Hydro. The diﬀerence in the order
book shape may also come from pick oﬀ risk, inducing investors to submit orders at prices with a
compensation for the risk of trading with an informed trader. Probably both eﬀects contribute to
explaining the pictures we see in ﬁgure 2. However, while it is obvious that there are huge diﬀer-
ences in valuation uncertainty between the two companies, it is not so obvious that there should
be such a big diﬀerence in pick oﬀ risk. More importantly, it is mainly orders submitted close to
the midpoint that are exposed to pick oﬀ risk, not orders submitted further away from the market.
Thus, pick oﬀ risk should aﬀect the spread and volumes at the inner ticks, not the distribution of
orders across the the entire order book. Nontheless, it is important to note that we do not attempt
to diﬀerentiate between the two eﬀects in this analysis.
To capture the shape of the order book, we propose to use the average elasticity/slopes of the
supply and demand schedules in the order book. The more gentle (steeper) the slope, the more
widely distributed (concentrated) are the bid and ask prices in the order book. Hence, if the slopes
of the supply and demand curves in the order book are gentle, that is, if the volume in the order
book is distributed across a wide range of prices, we interpret this as an indication that the investors
disagree about the value of the security. Similarly, if the slopes are steep, that is, if a large fraction
volume of around 200 000 shares.
22of the order book volume is concentrated around the inner quotes, we interpret this as an indication
that there is a high degree of agreement among investors about the fair value of the security.36 We
calculate our slope/elasticity estimate for each company and for each of the generated snapshots
of the order book in the following steps:
1. First, for each side of the order book, we accumulate the aggregate number of shares sup-
plied/demanded at each price level, such that at each price level we get the total volume
supplied (demanded) at that price or lower (higher).
2. Next, we normalize the accumulated shares at each tick level (on the ask and bid side sep-
arately) relative to the total number of shares supplied/demanded at the relevant snapshot.
Thus, the percentage of the shares in the order book supplied (demanded) at the highest
(lowest) ask (bid) price/tick is 100 per cent.
3. Next, we calculate the “local” elasticity at each price level (explained in equation 10 and
equation 11 in the appendix).
4. Next, we average across all price levels to obtain an average elasticity/slope for the bid and
ask side for that snapshot.
5. Finally, we take the average of the bid and ask slope to get one slope measure for the snapshot.
We normalize the order book because we want to take into account that there is a close relationship
between our slope measure and the liquidity of the underlying stock. Less liquid ﬁrms generally
have a higher volatility since the order book does not contain enough volume to absorb large trades
without moving prices to much. In addition, less liquid stocks generally have a higher spread since
investors require a discount when buying and a premium when selling the stock. Thus, a positive
relationship between order book elasticity and volatility is expected a priori. By normalizing the
order book, we get the fraction of total shares supplied/demanded at each price level. In addition,
we calculate slope measures based on two diﬀerent weighting schemes. In the ﬁrst we equally weight
each local slope, and in the latter, we weight each local slope by its distance (in ticks) from the
inner quote. In addition, we also calculate a “non-normalized” version of the slopes by using the
absolute volume (in shares) at each order book level.
36Disagreement about the value of the ﬁrm may be a function of the degree to which the company releases infor-
mation to the market, the number of analysts covering the stock etc.
23Figure 3: Calculating the demand and supply elasticities
The ﬁgure illustrates how the local slopes/elasticities of the bid and ask side of the order book is calculated for one ”snapshot”
time on one date for one company. The ﬁgure illustrates this for a case where there are only 4 price levels on both side of the
book. On the left y-axis we have the fraction of aggregate share volume for the demand (bid) side of the order book at each
tick level, and on the right y-axis we have the fraction of aggregate share volume for the supply (ask) side of the order book
at each tick level. The solid step-line is the supply (right) and demand (left) curves across the various price levels. On the
x-axis, we have the various price levels, where pM is the bid ask midpoint, and prices greater than pM are ask prices and prices
below pM are bid prices. The diﬀerence between pB
1 (best bid) and pA
1 (best ask) is the quoted spread. In addition, the dotted
line-segments connecting each level of the order book has slopes denoted by ∆s, which are the normalized local elasticities of


























































24Figure 3 illustrates how the local elasticities, ∆A
τ and ∆B
τ, are calculated. For illustrative purposes,
the order book in the ﬁgure stretches only across 4 price levels on each side. In the ﬁgure, pA
1 is
the best available ask-price (inner ask quote) with volume fraction of vA
1 supplied at that ask price.
The volume fraction at the next tick level (vA
2 ) is thus the accumulated volume supplied at price
pA
1 and pA
2 relative to the total volume in the order book at each side. The local elasticity of the
supply curve at pA
1 would thus be the slope ∆A
2 in the ﬁgure. A more speciﬁc explanation of the
calculation is provided in the appendix.
5 Intraday analysis of the order book
In this section, we present intraday statistics of the limit order book.
Table 4 showed that the use of market orders was quite modest in our data sample. Hence, to
describe the composition of orders in the book we focus on the aggressiveness of the limit orders. To
facilitate this, we calculate a separate index reﬂecting limit order aggressiveness. The aggressiveness
of an order is measured by the average number of ticks away from the best quote (on the same side)
that the order is placed.37 Thus an index number of zero means that the average order is placed at
the quote, a positive index number means that the order is placed above (below) the bid (ask), and
a negative number means that the average order is placed below (above) the bid (ask).38 Formally,
for an order of type k, the aggressiveness of a buy order with a limit price pB is calculated as,
λ
buy
k = (pB − bid)/ticksize (6)
Similarly, a sell order with a limit price pS is calculated as,
λsell
k = (ask − pS)/ticksize (7)
where bid and ask is the best bid quote and best ask quote, respectively, when the order is
submitted.
Table 5 shows intraday statistics for our slope measure (calculated at the end of each time
interval), the price volatility (measured as the absolute hourly return between trade prices closest
to the end of each time interval), the quoted and the eﬀective spread, the number of trades executed
37Our measure is similar to the measure of limit order aggressiveness proposed by Harris and Hasbrouck (1996).
38We cannot calculate the aggressiveness for market orders since these orders do not have a price limit.
25Table 5: Intraday statistics
The table shows intraday statistics for our slope measure, the volatility (the absolute hourly return between trade prices closest
to the end of each interval), the quoted spread, the eﬀective spread, the number of trades executed during the time interval,
the trade size (in shares), the number of orders submitted during the time interval and the order size (in shares). All numbers
are daily averages across all ﬁrms in the sample. Note that the ﬁrst and last time windows are half an hour while the rest of
the time windows are hourly. In addition, the slope is calculated at the end of each interval.
Time window
10:00 to 10:30 to 11:30 to 12:30 to 13:30 to 14:30 to 15:30 to
10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30 16:00
Slope (end of time-window) 30.51 34.37 35.78 36.34 36.80 36.97
Volatility (absolute return) - 1.34 % 0.81 % 0.72 % 0.74 % 0.88 % 0.86 %
Quoted spread 2.36 1.73 1.47 1.37 1.33 1.31 1.39
Eﬀective spread 1.79 1.27 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.05
Trades 10.38 11.81 9.38 9.05 9.52 10.81 10.40
Trade size (shares) 2314 2653 2759 2774 2834 3027 3123
Orders 15.45 18.16 13.10 12.36 12.47 14.02 11.66
Order size (shares) 6858 6385 5723 5818 5795 6383 6706
during the time interval, the trade and order sizes measured in shares, and the number of orders
submitted during the time interval. All numbers are daily averages across all ﬁrms in the sample.
Notable characteristics of the intraday statistics in table 5 are
• The quoted and the eﬀective spread both have a U-shape, with the highest spread at the
beginning of the day.
• The average trade size is smallest at the beginning of the day, and increasing throughout the
trading day.
• The average number of orders and trades both have a U shaped, with less orders being placed
and trades being executed in the middle of the day, and most orders being placed and trades
being executed at the beginning of the day.
These regularities are also systematic across sub periods.39 Similar systematic intraday regularities
have been found in other markets (e.g. US, France, Hong Kong). The main explanation suggested
for these ﬁndings is that the probability of trading with informed traders is largest at the beginning
of the trading day and then diminish during the day. If this explanation is correct, a patient liquidity
trader who fears to be picked oﬀ by informed investors at the beginning of the day has two main
options. If she believes that the probability of trading with informed traders will diminish during
39We calculate the statistics across sub periods of years, half years and quarters and ﬁnd that the results are both
qualitatively and quantitatively the same.
26the day, she can act strategically and delay her trading, as suggested by Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1988). Alternatively, she can submit her orders at the beginning of the day and take account
of the increased probability of incurring a loss by placing them at prices including a discount
(buys) or a premium (sells). This can explain the higher spread at the beginning of the trading
day.40 Assuming that the informed traders are trying not to reveal their information too quickly,
we would also expect to see a higher number of small trades at the beginning of the trading day
(stealth trading strategies).
Our data sample enables us to investigate the stylized facts documented in the earlier literature
and in table 5 in more detail. Table 6 shows intraday changes in order aggressiveness, average
number of orders, fraction of order types, and order sizes. Figure 4 illustrate graphically the
intraday patterns in order aggressiveness, order size, order book slope, quoted and eﬀective spread,
and fraction of order types.
If uninformed investors believe that there is more asymmetric information at the beginning of the
trading day, we would expect to see that they place orders at limit prices further away from the
midpoint price at the beginning of the trading day, and then, closer to the midpoint prices later in
the day, as the market price adjusts to the private information. Moreover, we would expect that
the orders placed by better informed investors were most aggressive in the beginning of the day,
especially if informed investors are competing to extract proﬁts from the same information. This is
exactly what is indicated in our data sample. There are systematic diﬀerences in the aggressiveness
of diﬀerent types of orders during the course of the day. “Away from market” orders, which make
up a large part of the order book, is placed relatively much further away from the inner quotes
at the beginning than at the end of the day. If this type of orders are mainly submitted by
uninformed traders, it indicates that they require a higher compensation for trading early in the
day relative to later in the day.41 Furthermore, orders that are more aggressive, and likely to stem
from better informed investors or pre-committed liquidity traders, are relatively more aggressive at
the beginning of the day than later in the day. At the end of the trading day all types of orders are
submitted closer to the inner quotes, indicating that most of the private information is incorporated
into the prices.
40The increase in spreads towards the end of the day is due to higher liquidity demand and possibly more cancellation
of orders just before the close.
41Another interpretation is that uninformed traders have not yet processed all publicly available information (e.g.
newspapers, new analyses, gossip etc.), and are more passive when submitting their orders before they have been
able to read and interpret this information.
27Table 6: Intraday statistics and aggressiveness of orders
In the table we decomposes all submitted orders within each time interval into groups based on the aggressiveness of the orders.
The least aggressive orders, ”away from market”, are orders placed at or away from the quote on the same side of the book.
This would be e.g. a buy order with a price (bid) equal to or lower than the current best bid, or a sell order with a price (ask)
equal to or higher than the best ask price. The second type of orders, ”quote improving orders”, are orders that improve the
best quotes. This would be e.g. a buy order with a price higher than the current best bid, but lower than the best ask quote.
The third type of orders are ”aggressive orders” are orders placed at the opposite quote or higher(buys)/lower(sells). In the
table we calculate the average number of orders of each type placed within each time window, the percentage fraction of all
orders of each type, and the average order size in shares and NOK. For each type of order we also calculate an aggressiveness
index equal to the average number of ticks away from the best quote (on the same side) that an order is submitted. Thus an
index number of zero means that the average order is placed at the quote, a positive index number means that the order is
placed above/below the bid/ask, and a negative index number means that the average order is placedbelow/above the bid/ask.
We do not calculate the aggressiveness for market orders since these by deﬁnition do not have any limit price. Note that the
ﬁrst and last time window are half an hour while the rest of the time windows are hourly.
Time window
10:00 to 10:30 to 11:30 to 12:30 to 13:30 to 14:30 to 15:30 to
Order type 10:30 11:30 12:30 13:30 14:30 15:30 16:00
Aggressiveness
(avg. ticks away from best quote)
Passive orders -12.81 -9.96 -8.45 -8.02 -7.44 -6.90 -5.87
Quote improving orders 6.90 5.30 4.65 4.17 4.16 3.94 3.96
Aggressive orders 9.36 7.46 6.82 6.68 6.17 6.29 6.29
Average aggressiveness (weighted) -1.69 -1.00 -0.25 -0.06 0.20 0.52 1.11
Average number of orders
Passive orders 8.2 9.1 6.4 5.9 5.7 6.2 5.0
Quote improving orders 3.3 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.5
Aggressive orders 5.4 6.9 5.5 5.3 5.5 6.3 5.6
Market orders 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3
% fraction of orders of type
Passive orders 44.2 % 43.4 % 39.9 % 38.7 % 37.2 % 36.7 % 34.6 %
Quote improving orders 17.7 % 16.3 % 17.1 % 17.3 % 17.6 % 17.7 % 17.4 %
Aggressive orders 29.4 % 32.9 % 34.2 % 34.7 % 36.2 % 37.3 % 39.0 %
Market orders 8.6 % 7.4 % 8.8 % 9.3 % 9.0 % 8.3 % 8.9 %
Order size (shares)
Passive orders 7202 6548 5716 5557 5938 6370 7317
Quote improving orders 7793 6568 6486 6470 6561 6915 7294
Aggressive orders 5461 5301 5498 6008 5649 6569 7239
Market orders 1412 1576 1855 1751 1795 1678 2281
Order size (1000 NOK)
Passive orders 275 235 222 221 242 267 346
Quote improving orders 274 253 258 265 274 290 328
Aggressive orders 188 204 204 214 227 376 307
Market orders 36 39 46 42 40 43 69
28Figure 4: Intraday characteristics
The ﬁgures shows cross sectional averages across 7 intraday windows for various measures. The windows and numbers correspond
to those in tables 5 and 6. Note that window 1 and 7 are half hour intervals from 10:00 to 10:30 and 15:30 to 16:00 respectively,
while windows 2 to 6 are hourly intervals starting every half hour. Figure (a) shows the average aggressiveness of diﬀerent order
types. The ﬁrst type of orders, ”passive orders”, are placed at or away from the quote on the same side of the book. This would
be e.g. a buy order with a price (bid) equal to or lower than the current best bid, or a sell order with a price (ask) equal to or
higher than the best ask price. The second type of orders, ”quote improving orders”, are orders that improve the best quote
(on the same side). This would be e.g. a buy order with a price higher than the current best bid, but lower than the best ask
quote. The third type of orders are ”aggressive orders” are orders placed at the opposite quote or higher(buys)/lower(sells).
Figure (b) shows the average order size within each limit order group and the average order size of market orders. Figure (c)
show the average slope on the left axis and the average quoted and eﬀective spreads on the right axis. Note that the slope is
calculated from the order book snapshot taken at the end of each window. Figure (d) shows the fraction of each order category







































































































































































































29The average number of passive orders (“away from market”) decreases throughout the day, while
the average number of quote improving orders and aggressive orders has a U-shape. The number
of submitted market orders decreases throughout the trading day.42 The intraday pattern in the
relative fraction of each order type indicates that more orders are submitted closer to the midpoint
at the end of the day. When examining the average order sizes across the diﬀerent order types,
“away from the market” orders are the largest at the open and close, while the most aggressive
limit orders and market orders are the smallest and increase in size throughout the day. If informed
investors mainly use aggressive limit orders and market orders, this may indicate that they submit
smaller orders when their information is the most valuable (stealth trading).
Given that there is more asymmetric information at the beginning of the trading day, the
intraday pattern of our slope estimate captures asymmetric information about stock values during
the trading day quite well. The slope increases (at a diminishing rate) across the day, with a
minimum at the beginning of the day and a maximum at the end of the day. This indicates that
the order book is more dispersed in the morning relative to later in the day. In other words, a
larger fraction of the order volume is submitted further from the inner quotes just after the open
compared to later in the day. Recall that the average slope is calculated from the normalized order
book, so that the slope does not just reﬂect that there are less orders in the order book early in the
day.43 Across time windows, the average slope increases at a diminishing rate and becomes more
concentrated and elastic at the end of the day.
6 The Volume-Volatility-Order Book Relation
In section 4, we argued that our estimate of the average daily slope of the order book could be
used as a proxy for the dispersion of beliefs among investors about asset values. In this section, we
provide some descriptive statistics of the estimated daily slope and investigate whether this variable
can explain the contemporaneous market volatility in addition to the variables suggested by Jones
et al. (1994).
Panel A in table 7 shows the correlations between the diﬀerent versions of our daily slope
measure which we outlined in section 4. As can be seen from the table, the slope estimates are
42Note that the ﬁrst and last windows in the table are half-hour intervals, while all other windows are hourly
intervals.
43A lower average slope reﬂects that the order book is more elastic which implies that a lower fraction of the order
volume is close to the inner quotes relative to further out in the book.
30Table 7: Variable correlations
Panel A shows the correlation between diﬀerent slope measures. ”Volume slope” is the average slope calculated from the order
book without normalizing the volume at each tick relative to the total share volume in the book. ”Weighted volume slope” is the
weighted version of ”volume slope”, where we weight each local slope by the distance in ticks from the best quote. ”Normalized
slope” is when we at each snapshot normalizes the volume at each tick relative to the total number of shares in the book (on
the respective side), and ”Weighted normalized slope” is the tick weighted version of the ”Normalized slope”. Panel B shows
the correlations between various activity and liquidity variables as well as our elasticity variable (SLOPE).
PANEL A: Correlation between slope measures
Volume Weighted Normalized
slope volume slope slope (SLOPE)
Weighted volume slope 1.00
Normalized slope (SLOPE) 0.72 0.72
Weighted normalized slope 0.72 0.72 0.98
PANEL B: Variable correlations
Trade size
Trades (N) shares (AV) MCAP SPREAD SLOPE Ordervol. (OV)
Tradesize shares (AV) -0.02
MCAP 0.25 -0.04
SPREAD -0.20 0.16 -0.17
SLOPE 0.13 -0.08 0.44 -0.32
Order volume shares (OV) 0.19 0.16 0.06 -0.06 0.04
Trade volume shares (V) 0.43 0.33 0.14 -0.13 0.08 0.45
highly correlated. However, the variance of the weighted slope estimate is higher. This is mainly
due to the high variation in order book volume across ﬁrms and time.
Table 8 provides some distributional statistics for the slope estimate over the whole sample, for the
separate years, and for our four size portfolios.44
As one would expect, the slope increases with market capitalization. Thus, larger and more liquid
stocks have a higher fraction of the order book volume concentrated at or around the best quotes,
while smaller ﬁrms have more dispersed order books. Another feature to note about the table is
that the average/median slope decreases across market capitalizations. A possible reason for this
is that large companies are generally easier to price than small companies due to more available
information and more frequent analysis by ﬁnancial experts.
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the daily equally weighted slope estimate and the
contemporaneous daily volatility, measured as the average daily absolute return over the trading
44We report results from the use of the equally weighted normalized slope estimates only. When we weight the
local slopes by the distance from the best tick, the results are quantitatively similar.
31Table 8: Distribution of equally weighted slope estimates
The table shows the distribution of the slope estimates for the case where each local slope is equally weighted and each side
of the order book is normalized with respect to the total number of shares on each side. Panel A report the estimates for the
entire sample and across minimum tick sizes. Panel B report the estimates across market capitalization portfolios and years.
In this case each company is assigned to a market capitalization portfolio each trading day instead of yearly (as used before).
This is because the slope estimates can vary widely across days so that a yearly sorting would not capture the diﬀerences across
market capitalizations to the same degree. Thus, N reﬂects the number of ﬁrm/date observations.
PANEL A
Distribution of slope estimates
N MCAP Price P5 P10 P25 Median Mean P75 P90 P95
All ﬁrms 51015 7294 145 9.1 11.9 18.3 29.2 37.2 46.7 70.9 91.5
1999 16968 5948 110 9.4 12.6 20.3 33.2 41.4 53.0 79.2 101.3
2000 23853 7737 180 9.6 12.2 18.0 27.6 35.3 43.5 66.3 86.0
2001 10194 8498 122 7.8 10.6 16.5 27.0 34.7 43.4 65.2 85.7
PANEL B
Distribution of slope estimates
N MCAP Price P5 P10 P25 Median Mean P75 P90 P95
MCAP Q1 (small) 12532 259 21 5.7 7.4 11.4 17.2 20.9 25.9 38.2 47.9
1999 4163 213 19 5.9 7.5 11.4 17.5 21.2 26.7 39.3 48.2
2000 5864 282 22 6.3 8.2 12.1 17.6 20.9 25.7 36.6 45.9
2001 2505 283 22 4.6 6.0 10.0 15.9 20.5 25.2 40.4 50.9
MCAP Q2 12828 1005 64 10.6 12.9 18.1 26.3 31.8 39.0 56.4 70.9
1999 4264 869 50 11.3 14.0 19.7 28.8 34.0 41.8 59.3 74.4
2000 5999 1035 69 10.7 12.8 17.7 25.1 30.2 36.9 53.1 66.8
2001 2565 1158 76 9.8 12.0 16.9 25.2 31.8 39.2 57.8 73.2
MCAP Q3 12672 2786 121 12.0 15.3 22.2 32.5 39.0 48.1 69.9 87.2
1999 4210 2289 106 15.3 19.1 26.5 38.1 45.2 55.8 78.9 98.1
2000 5934 2914 133 11.6 14.7 21.1 30.4 36.5 44.3 65.0 82.4
2001 2528 3315 121 10.6 13.1 19.5 28.9 34.5 43.0 61.3 75.8
MCAP Q4 (large) 12983 24698 369 18.0 22.1 31.6 47.1 56.5 69.4 101.6 128.8
1999 4331 20016 261 23.0 28.2 38.9 55.7 64.2 79.0 111.6 136.6
2000 6056 26320 491 16.7 21.0 29.2 44.0 53.1 64.6 94.6 120.3
2001 2596 28727 263 15.7 19.9 27.8 41.1 51.5 61.5 96.6 125.9
32day. Both variables are averaged over all securities which are traded during the respective days.
Figure 5: Average slope and volatility
The ﬁgure illustrates the relationship between the estimate of the average daily slope of the order book and the contemporaneous
daily price changes. The left axis measures the price change calculated as the average daily absolute return. The right axis
measures the slope estimate calculated as the daily equally weighted slope, averaged over all companies that were traded during
the trading day.

















The ﬁgure indicates that there is a negative relationship between the variables at a very aggregate
level, i.e. the price volatility seems to be high (low) when the average daily slope of the order book
is low (high). To examine more formally whether dispersion of investors’ beliefs can explain the
contemporaneous volatility across ﬁrms and time, we estimate modiﬁed versions of the volume-
volatility regression equations in section 3.3. Since our proxy for dispersion of beliefs may also
proxy for liquidity, it is important that we control for other liquidity measures such as the market
capitalization, spread and order book volume. As can be seen in table 7, the SLOPE variable is
positively correlated with market capitalization (MCAP) and the spread. However, it is not highly
correlated with the order book volume (OV) or any of the other variables. The correlation between
SLOPE and N is only about 13 percent.
Our model is estimated as a panel regression with one-way ﬁxed eﬀects. Since not all ﬁrms are
33traded every day,45 our sample is unbalanced.46 We estimate 3 models with varying explanatory
variables. Model 1 is the same as in the previous analysis, but with the SLOPE variable and the
other liquidity variables (market capitalization (MCAP), quoted inner spread (SPR) and order book
volume (OV)) as additional variables. In model 2, we do not control for other liquidity variables,
and in model 3 we exclude the trading activity (mixing) variables. We also estimate the same
regression equations across 3-month sub-periods.
The results from our ﬁnal estimations are provided in table 9. Generally, the estimated models




Xitkβk + ηit (8)
where | it | is the daily volatility estimate, Xitk is the matrix of explanatory variables (k) across
time (t) for each company (i) and ηi,t = νi + εi,t deﬁnes the error structure with νi as the
non-random ﬁxed, ﬁrm speciﬁc, eﬀect. Our model can be written as,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,tβ3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j | ^ i,t−j | +ηi,t.
(9)
The ﬁrst thing to note in Panel A in table 9 is that the dispersion of beliefs variable (SLOPE)
is highly signiﬁcant and negative. Thus, the more dispersed beliefs about the value of the ﬁrm, the
greater the volatility. This is an indication that a larger dispersion of prices in the order book is
linked to more “noise trading”.47 The result could also be related to rip oﬀ risk: if some liquidity
suppliers are informed about the volatility, as in the Foucault et al. (2003b) model, they may ﬁnd
it optimal to bid less aggressively when they know that the volatility is large.
The partial R2 indicates that the SLOPE variable is signiﬁcant compared to the other variables.
In model 2, when the liquidity proxies are removed, we see that the partial R2 for SLOPE increases.48
This indicates that the slope variable is also proxying for liquidity. However, the parameter estimate
45Recall that we ﬁltered out ﬁrms with less than 400 trading days throughout our sample period of 597 days.
46We also estimate all models on a balanced sample, reducing our sample to 25 ﬁrms when ﬁltering out all ﬁrms
that are not traded every day in the sample. The estimates and tests are quantitatively similar.
47A problem could be that a steeper slope implies a less pronounced bid-ask bounce, and thus a lower volatility.
However, as outlined in section 3.3, we try to avoid measurement errors due to the bid-ask bounce by calculating
returns using the average of bid-ask prices at the close.
48The partial R
2 is calculated as the average partial R
2 across single ﬁrm regressions.
34is stable across the three models. Another interesting thing to note is that the number of trades (N)
has a much larger contribution to R2 than the trade size (AV) which has a signiﬁcant parameter,
but a negligible R2 contribution. Thus, the Jones et al. (1994) result is also evident in the panel
analysis. Furthermore, we run the Hausman speciﬁcation test to determine whether a random
eﬀects model would be more appropriate than the one-way ﬁxed eﬀects model. The Hausman test
compares an ineﬃcient but consistent estimator (the ﬁxed eﬀects case) to an eﬃcient estimator
(the random eﬀects case).49 In all of the regressions we reject, at the 1% level, the hypothesis that
a random eﬀects model would be more appropriate.
It is also interesting to note the stability and signiﬁcance of the dispersion proxy also across
sub-samples, shown in panel B in table 9. The SLOPE variable is signiﬁcant at the 1% level within
each sub-sample. Also when performing an F-test for ﬁxed eﬀects, we reject the null of no ﬁxed
eﬀects at the 1% level within each sub-period regression. We interpret our results as supportive for
models where strategic trading and dispersion of beliefs among uninformed investors increase both
volatility and volume, and that this can be captured by the characteristics of the limit order book.
49Thus, the Hausman test is a test of H0, that random eﬀects would be consistent and eﬃcient, versus H1, that
random eﬀects would be inconsistent. Rejecting H0 would suggest that we should use a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
35Table 9: Panel regression with slope as explanatory variable across whole sample
The table shows the results from the panel regression with one-way ﬁxed eﬀects (least squares dummy variable estimation) for
the whole sample (Panel A) and for sub-periods of 3 month periods (Panel B). The estimated model (model 1) is,
| i,t |= β0Mi,t + β1Ni,t + β2AVi,tβ3MCAPi,t + β4SPRi,t+
β5OVi,t + β6SLOPEi,t +
12 X
j=1
ρi,j | ^ i,t−j | +ηi,t.
where ηi,t = νi + εi,t deﬁnes the error structure with νi as the non-random ﬁxed, ﬁrm speciﬁc, eﬀects. | i,t | is the absolute
return adjusted for day of week eﬀects and autocorrelation in returns. M is a dummy variable for Monday, N is the number
of transactions, AV is the average trade size in shares, MCAP is the market capitalization SPR is the relative spread (quoted
spread in % of the midpoint price), OV is the total number of shares in the order book (sum of all orders on bid and ask side
of the order book) and SLOPE is the average slope of the bid and oﬀer side of the order book. Panel A, shows the parameter
estimates for 3 variations of the full model (model 1). In model 2, we do not control for other liquidity variables (MCAP,
SPR, OV), and in model 3 we exclude the trading activity (N) and trade size (AV) variables. The table shows the associated
t-values as well as the adjusted R2 for each portfolio regression. The autoregressive estimates have been excluded from the
table. ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Panel B, shows the sub-period estimates for model 1 for the SLOPE, N and AV
variables with associated t-values in parenthesis, and the partial R-squared. For each period, the model R-squared, F-test for
ﬁxed eﬀects, and number of cross sectional observations (N) and number of time series observations (T) are reported in the last
four rows of the table.
PANEL A: Whole sample regression
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3
Variables Estimate Partial R2 Estimate Partial R2 Estimate Partial R2
M 0.023 0.00 % 0.039 0.00 % -0.010 0.00 %
Trades (N) 0.005∗∗ 4.17 % 0.005∗∗ 4.17 % - -
Trade size shares (AV) 0.020∗∗ 0.80 % 0.018∗∗ 0.80 % - -
MCAP -0.015∗∗ 1.97 % - - -0.001 0.82 %
Spread 0.234∗∗ 1.04 % - - 0.182∗∗ 0.63 %
Avg.slope -0.007∗∗ 2.17 % -0.009∗∗ 3.95 % -0.008∗∗ 2.25 %
Order book volume (shares) 0.026∗∗ 0.11 % 0.025∗∗ 0.09 % 0.052∗∗ 0.85 %
Adj.R2 21.5 % 20.5 % 18.3 %
N (cross section obs.) 98 98 98
T (time series obs.) 572 572 572
F-test ﬁxed eﬀects 16.34∗∗ 14.04∗∗ 10.80∗∗
PANEL B: Sub-period regression
SLOPE Trades (N) Trade size shares (AV)
F test
Quarter β6 (t-value) part.R2 β1 (t-value) part.R2 β2 (t-value) part.R2 adj.R2 ﬁxed eﬀ. N T
1999.1 -0.007 (-1.4) 2.13 % 0.016 ( 4.9) 0.79 % 0.074 (1.5) 2.48 % 37.6 % 2.6∗∗ 61 14
1999.2 -0.005 (-2.7) 2.65 % 0.013 (11.0) 0.41 % 0.049 (3.0) 4.93 % 26.6 % 4.3∗∗ 87 59
1999.3 -0.005 (-3.2) 2.78 % 0.011 (11.2) 0.79 % 0.059 (4.0) 5.06 % 36.7 % 7.7∗∗ 96 66
1999.4 -0.006 (-2.8) 3.16 % 0.014 (16.0) 1.94 % 0.033 (2.9) 1.65 % 27.5 % 5.5∗∗ 97 64
2000.1 -0.007 (-3.1) 2.17 % 0.013 (26.4) 7.75 % 0.027 (1.7) 0.48 % 31.0 % 8.0∗∗ 98 65
2000.2 -0.006 (-3.0) 2.90 % 0.012 (18.9) 10.44 % 0.025 (1.1) 1.11 % 30.7 % 5.2∗∗ 98 58
2000.3 -0.007 (-4.3) 1.89 % 0.009 (20.9) 7.87 % 0.006 (0.5) 0.12 % 29.6 % 6.4∗∗ 98 65
2000.4 -0.009 (-4.5) 3.30 % 0.008 (16.2) 6.01 % 0.023 (2.1) 0.33 % 21.6 % 4.1∗∗ 97 63
2001.1 -0.009 (-4.6) 1.71 % 0.003 ( 6.3) 7.93 % 0.001 (0.5) 0.59 % 25.6 % 5.2∗∗ 93 64
2001.2 -0.008 (-4.6) 1.86 % 0.002 ( 8.9) 3.47 % 0.030 (2.1) 0.21 % 25.9 % 4.7∗∗ 88 54
Average -0.007 (-3.4) 2.46 % 0.010 (14.1) 4.74 % 0.033 (1.8) 1.70 % 29.3 %
367 Conclusions
A positive correlation between price volatility and trading volume has been documented in a variety
of studies. However, the explanations for the phenomenon is still not well understood. Finding
plausible explanations for the relation is important in that it can enhance our understanding of
how information is disseminated into market prices. There are two, mainly complementary, expla-
nations. The mixture of distribution hypothesis states that the volume-volatility relation is driven
by a directing process that can be interpreted as the ﬂow of information. More speciﬁcally, the
daily price change and the trading volume are thought to be mixtures of independent normals with
the same mixing variable. The dispersion of beliefs hypothesis states that the volume-volatility
relation is stronger the greater the dispersion of beliefs about security values is among investors.
The explanation behind this statement is based on asymmetric information and strategic investor
behavior. Uninformed traders cannot distinguish informed trades from liquidity trades, and by
reacting to trades with no information content, they increases both volatility and volume relative
to equilibrium values in a situation with symmetric information.
We examine the volume-volatility relation empirically using a very detailed data set from the
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). We ﬁrst show that the result in Jones et al. (1994) that average size
of trades has little marginal explanatory power when volatility is conditioned on trade frequency
also applies in a pure limit order driven market. A unique feature of our data sample is that we can
rebuild the whole order book at any time during the trading day. This enables us to investigate
the intraday pattern of the order ﬂows and to test a version of the distribution of beliefs hypothesis
where we measure dispersion of beliefs by the slope of the demand and supply schedules of the
order book. Our intraday analysis supports the notion that there is more asymmetric information
early in the trading day, and that this is captured by the slope of the order book. We also ﬁnd that
there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between our proxy for the dispersion of beliefs among
investors and the contemporaneous market volatility which also is stable across sub-periods.
37A Calculating slope measures
To explain the slope calculation more speciﬁcally, let NA and NB be respectively the total number
of ask and bid prices (tick levels) containing orders. Let τ denote the tick level, and let τ = 1
represent the inner quote. Furthermore, let pB
1 and pA
1 be respectively the best bid- and ask prices,
and let pM denote the bid-ask midpoint (which is the average of pB
1 and pA
1 ). Let vB
τ and vA
τ be
respectively the percentage of total volume at each tick level on the bid and ask side of the book.
Finally, let ωB
τ and ωA
τ denote the weight of the local slope calculated at tick level τ for respectively
the bid and the ask side of the book. The average elasticity for the supply curve, SE, on day t at












































The ﬁrst term of both equations expresses the slope between the bid-ask midpoint and the best bid
and ask prices, while the second term of both equations expresses the sum of the local elasticities











If we based our estimates of daily elasticities on one snapshot only, they could easily be biased
due to large trades having temporarily reduced the liquidity of one side of the book or systematic
time of day eﬀects. To obtain a less noisy representation of the average daily supply and demand
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